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Nontechnical Summary 
by Ashley Moore 
 
 The state of Connecticut has been severely impacted by the recent financial crisis, 
perhaps more greatly than other states. It was our objective to apply the skills we have 
acquired as an undergraduate class in Economic Forecasting at Sacred Heart University 
in Fairfield, Connecticut, to compare various economic indicators and trends of the State 
of Connecticut to those of the United States. We ultimately wanted to evaluate the real 
Connecticut economy, labor market developments, public sector, housing market and 
financial sector to determine the direction Connecticut fiscal policy should be steered in 
the future. The six groups of students were allotted a particular part of the economy to 
further investigate through statistical and literary research. Ultimately, we used our 
resources and statistical software to develop the forecasts throughout this paper.  
 
 Our findings indicate that the real economy of Connecticut is improving, although 
at a slower rate than the overall nation. Although the State has generated the same  gross 
domestic product (GDP) growth as the nation in 2012 at 2.5%, our baseline scenario 
analysis indicates GDP growth in Connecticut will dip to about 2.3% in 2013 but increase 
a tenth of a percent each year until it reaches 2.5% in 2015. Our estimation output shows 
that worst-case scenario state growth would be 1.8%, by 2015 and best-case scenario 
growth would be 3.2% by 2015. Despite the appeal of a 3.2% growth projection, we feel 
as if reforms in the state economy as well as elevated tax rates both on households and 
businesses relative to the majority of the nation will cause a more stagnant growth than 
3.2%.   
 
Inflation in the State, as well as the nation, has been subdued thus far. Inflation 
estimates calculated in this forecast are based on the Consumer Price Index (CPI). 
Intuitively, we are anticipating an increase in CPI during the periods 2013-2015 due to 
the current monetary policy of the Federal Reserve, as well as a steady increase in real 
aggregate demand. Our numbers indicate an increase in inflation from 2.1% in 2012 to 
2.5% in 2013, 3.2% in 2014 and 3.4% in 2015. However, we feel as if by the latter part of 
our forecast, inflation numbers we be driven by the spending and dis-saving of both 
consumers and business. Additionally, banks and small businesses are likely to feel 
profitability tighten as inflation adjusted lending interest rates will be minuscule.  
 
The unemployment rate is a major economic indicator in constant limelight and 
currently, scrutiny. Whether uttered throughout the media or the basis of a political 
debate, the unemployment rate since the financial crisis has soared to distasteful numbers.  
In 2012, the state unemployment rate of the civilian labor force was 8.0%, which 
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exceeded the overall US economy unemployment. This high level reflects through 
structural state reforms that are discussed further throughout the paper. Such a high level 
of unemployment is also due to high taxation in the state. Taxation on properties in most 
of Connecticut townships is rising at a rapid pace, as well as high taxation on business 
profits. Historically, the state’s unemployment has followed a strikingly similar pattern 
post-recession. Under the assumption that this pattern will hold as the state climbs out of 
the recent recession, we project unemployment to drop to 7.2% by year-end 2014, and 
6.8% by year-end 2015.  
 
 While Connecticut seemed to fair better during the recent financial crisis than the 
rest of the United States, it was not able to escape the housing bubble unscathed. The 
financial crisis’ effects of this were noticeable across the entire housing market, as it 
affected housing starts, home ownership, home vacancy and housing prices. In the 
aftermath of the crisis, as of the beginning of 2013, single-family homes rose 
significantly since early 2012, deposits on condominiums rose nearly 30% - the highest 
level in three years, and financial institutions have begun approving more housing loans. 
Median home prices have stabilized after a full year of consistent growth in both the 
number of deposits and closings. We believe the consistent growth period that 
Connecticut has seen over 2012 is important as it will drive the housing market back 
towards equilibrium for the periods of 2013-2015. On the other hand, 2013 also had some 
negative indicators for the housing market. The rental market saw nearly 3% less leases, 
foreclosures are on the rise, and more people are leaning towards more affordable homes 
rather than the large luxury home market the state possesses. Because there is a clear 
mixture of positive and negative feedback from the first quarter of 2013, we believe a 
reasonable forecast would be slight growth in 2013 due to forecasted decreasing rates of 
unemployment, and more growth in 2014-2015 as the housing market and economy 
slowly reach an equilibrium. 
 
 The financial crisis has had an effect on banks at the local, state, and national 
level. Many banks faced solvency issues, causing an epidemic of filed bankruptcies 
across the banking sector. Basel Committee on Banking Supervision has issued Basel II 
and Basel III scenarios, which are recommendations on banking laws and regulations. 
These were intended to create an international standard for banking regulators to control 
how much capital banks need to put aside to guard against the types of financial and 
operational risks banks face. Currently, commercial banks are meeting Basel III 
standards, but not by much. There is still much more room to increase solvency within 
our commercial banks. Connecticut commercial banks have been more profitable for a 
few reasons. Firstly, since the outbreak of the recent financial crisis in Q3 2007, there has 
been 483 failed or government assisted banks, zero of which have taken place in 
Connecticut. Commercial banks are most likely to remain profitable after the Federal 
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Reserve announced on May 1st 2013 that they would continue their asset-purchasing 
program of purchasing $85 billion of treasuries and mortgage-backed securities each 
month into 2014.  
 As many of us are students graduating entering the work force in the tri-state area, 
we feel recognizing the issues and taking steps to better the state economy should be top 
priority because it will help open doors for future students to seek employment after they 
complete their education in order to pay back debt and contribute to the economy. The 
highly service-driven economy of Connecticut faced harsh repercussions from the 
financial crisis, however; hopefully new laws and regulations will help to prevent a 
similar crash in the future. In order to fully protect itself from such an occurrence, we feel 
that Connecticut needs to work towards creating more of a manufacturing sector, like it 
once had. By focusing on the diversification of the labor market and making the State a 
more business-friendly environment, we hope that Connecticut’s economy will return to a 
prosperous state.  
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I. Outlook for the Real Economy of Connecticut 
by Anna Kadlof & Suzanne May 
 
Forecast Summary 
 
The current economic condition of Connecticut is improving since the recent 
financial crisis. When compared at the national level, Connecticut has been recovering at 
a slightly slower pace.   
 
Real Gross State Product: 
 
Based on our estimation, the State real economy, i.e. real gross domestic product, grew at 
the annual rate of 2.5% in 2012, which was exactly the same as the rate of growth of the 
US economy. Our models, which technical features are described below, imply that the 
State real GDP will grow at a somewhat slower pace of 2.3% in 2013. It will modestly 
accelerate to the growth rate of 2.4% in 2014 and 2.5% in 2015.  The low-growth 
scenario implies the rate of growth of 1.8% by 2015, and the most optimistic scenario 
suggests 3.2%. However, considering the ongoing structural changes in the State 
economy accompanied by the high overall taxation of households and businesses relative 
to the overwhelming majority of US states, the high-growth scenario seems extremely 
unlikely.   
 
Inflation (Based on State CPI): 
 
Just like in the national US economy, inflation in the State has been so far subdued. 
However, we anticipate the rate of increase in consumer price index to accelerate during 
the period 2013-2015. Our data show that the rate of inflation based on the year-on-year 
changes in the State consumer price index was 2.1 % in 2012. We expect it to increase to 
2.5% in 2013, 3.2% in 2014 and 3.4% in 2015. The ongoing highly accommodative, 
“ultra-easy” monetary policy of the Federal Reserve, along with a modest increase in real 
aggregate demand should contribute to acceleration in the rate of inflation. The expected 
inflation for the end of our forecast period will likely stipulate dissaving by consumers 
and businesses. It will put a squeeze on profitability of banks and most of small 
businesses as real (inflation adjusted) interest rates will likely move to a decisively 
negative territory. 
 
Unemployment: 
 
The State unemployment rate of the civilian labor force was 8.0%. Its high level that 
exceeds the overall rate for the US economy reflects the ongoing, deep structural changes 
that we elaborate below. It unfortunately also reflects high overall taxation in the State, 
particularly high, and rising at a fast pace property taxation in the majority of Connecticut 
townships, as well as high taxation of business profits. The Connecticut unemployment 
adjustment patterns following recessionary periods display a remarkable similarity, as 
shown on the graph below. Assuming a similar response to the recent recession and 
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running the technical forecast specified below, we expect that the unemployment rate will 
decline to 7.2% by the end of 2014 and 6.8% by the end of 2015. 
 
 
 
  
 Models and Technical Explanations 
 
After running a least square regression for the state of Connecticut real GDP, it was 
determined that the regression is optimized at ARMA(4,2). The ARMA(4,2) 
regression had an AIC of 18.52268. However, only the constant was significant in 
this regression. From this model we were able to forecast real GDP. It was a stable 
forecast because the Theil Inequality Coefficient was 0.013211, very close to the 
targeted value of 0. The bias 0.001510 and variance proportion 0.123239 were 
minimized while the covariance portion 0.875251 was maximized. Thus, this is a 
robust forecast, which is depicted below in graph 1. Our forecast depicts that 
Connecticut’s economy and real GDP is to continue to rise. This slow recovery may 
be due to Connecticut’s heavy reliance on the financial services industry for the 
states GDP. 
 
Table 1: 
MA\AR 0 1 2 3 4 
0  20.21623 20.39676 20.31630 20.54312 
1 20.77298 20.27830 20.13925 20.40457 20.52884 
2 20.15656 19.85623 20.20479 20.08749 18.52268 
3 20.47908 19.91713 20.41781 20.22254 20.04131 
4 20.03395 19.55602 20.26706 19.511591 20.07010 
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Graph 1: 
 
 
After examining the change in real GDP in Connecticut we were able to 
optimize the equation using ARMA(4,3) (Table 1). That is, the residuals for 
Connecticut real GDP are dependent on the last three periods, and the values are 
affected by the past four periods. This regression had an AIC of 19.11152, greater 
than the Connecticut real GDP regression, suggesting that the previous regression 
using real Connecticut GDP is more robust. We were unable to forecast this 
regression due to lack of data. 
 
Table 2: 
 
MA\AR 0 1 2 3 4 
0  20.53363 20.64168 20.55539 20.86937 
1 20.39684 20.43046 20.38993 20.71612 21.04154 
2 20.31610 20.25574 20.42948 20.28803 21.02470 
3 19.75265 19.94537 20.29519 20.36441 19.11152 
4 20.42669 20.37809 20.47079 20.88234 21.15662 
 
 In addition to this regression, we also conducted a time trend analysis. In this 
analysis we found that the quadratic version of the regression was more ROBUST. 
Both the trend, and the @trend component are significant at the 1% level. The AIC 
for just the @trend component was 20.64586, while also including the @trend^2 
the AIC was 20.09412. However, this AIC is worse then the original regression run 
with ARMA(4,2). 
 
 In addition to Connecticut real GDP and the change in Connecticut GDP, we 
also examined the rate of unemployment in both Connecticut and the United States. 
Below is graph 2, a scattergram of real GDP growth versus unemployment. This 
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graph suggests that as unemployment grows, real GDP for Connecticut will decline 
as well. 
 
Graph 2: 
 
 
 
 When graphing the Connecticut Unemployment rate vs. the national 
unemployment rate (graphs 3&4), we found that the Connecticut unemployment 
rate has surpassed the national level. Viewing the quarterly data, Connecticut 
unemployment rate was below the national rate up until the first quarter of 2011.  
However, by the second quarter the unemployment rates were equal, and by the 
third quarter Connecticut’s unemployment rate again dipped below the national 
level. Then again in second quarter 2012, the Connecticut unemployment rate has 
surpassed the national unemployment rate and has been continuously. Despite 
these fluctuations, after viewing the graph it is evident that both Connecticut and 
the national rate of unemployment are following a somewhat similar trend. In this 
graph, it is also evident that both the Connecticut unemployment rate and the 
national unemployment rate are trending towards the natural rate of 
unemployment. 
 
Graph 3: 
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 In addition to quarterly data, we also examined the annual unemployment 
data for Connecticut and the United States. Since 1995, the Connecticut 
unemployment rate has been less than the national unemployment rate right up 
until 2010, when the annual Connecticut unemployment rate surpassed the national 
unemployment rate by 1.1%. This is a disappointment for Connecticut considering 
unemployment rate measures the relative economic performance of the state, and 
by this standard the local economy of Connecticut is weakening, just like the US as a 
whole. However, Connecticut unemployment rate seems to follow the trend of the 
US unemployment rate therefore we feel that Connecticut will also experience a 
decrease in unemployment.  
 
Graph 4: 
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 When running Connecticut unemployment as a function of real GDP, we 
found that real GDP is significant at the 10% level. Its coefficient was significantly 
small, 7.27 x 10^-5. This means that a $1,000,000 increase in real GDP, will lead to a 
0.0000727% increase in unemployment, which is counterintuitive. This however is 
most likely caused by the small sample size, for this regression was run using annual 
data, for quarterly data for Connecticut real GDP was unavailable.   
 
 Also when examining Connecticut exports with national exports in graph 5, it 
is evident that Connecticut’s exports follow a similar upward trend as US exports. As 
you can see, the slope is very shallow, representing the demise of manufacturing. 
  
Graph 5: 
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 In addition, we calculated inflation using two different methods. One using 
CPI and the other using changes in GDP, depicted below in graph 6. We found that 
when using the CPI method, it gave a more accurate description of the inflation in 
Connecticut. At the end of 2009, the US economy experienced a period of deflation. 
This is mirrored in the graph modeled by change in CPI, where as the inflation 
indicator calculated by GDP shows deflation at approximately 1% during the time 
period. 
 
Graph 6: 
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Overall, the economic outlook for the real economy is improving. Connecticut 
has been on the rise in terms of GDP, reducing unemployment, and closer to the 
targeted inflation. Although this is positive news for Connecticut, these 
improvements have only been gradual, especially when compared to the US 
economy as a whole. 
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II. Structural Changes in Connecticut Economy – A Ten-Year Perspective 
by Elisabeth Pitruzzella and Corinne Lajoie  
Connecticut experienced sudden rise in unemployment in years 2002 and 2003 
and again in 2009 and 2010. These unemployment fluctuations and the related discussion 
is the focus of our study. We looked at the unemployment trend in Connecticut and 
compared it to the USA level rates. Further, we also looked at the trends in the GDP 
growth at these two levels and tried to deduce the reasons behind the jumps in 
unemployment. Lastly, we used time series forecasting to analyze the unemployment rate 
in Connecticut and investigate whether the unemployment rate will follow upward or 
downward trend in coming months. 
 
Throughout this section of the paper we will analyze the unemployment trends 
both nationally and statewide, discuss the data and methodology used in our analysis, and 
discuss our results and policy recommendations.  
 
Recent Trends in Unemployment 
 
The unemployment rate in Connecticut was significantly lower than the national 
unemployment level until 2002, which can be seen in the graph below. As we can see, the 
red line representing the Connecticut unemployment rate starts well below the United 
States unemployment level in 2000 and went beyond the national level for the first time 
in 2011. The rather irregular patterns in unemployment rate in Connecticut can be 
generally characterized by a rising unemployment phase, followed by a rather sedate or 
falling phase. However, since the state of Connecticut started facing rising 
unemployment rates in 2007, it has not since hit the downward or plateau phase that it 
has historically faced in the past.  
 
 
We also looked at the GDP trends to see how the state and national economies 
have been performing in general. It is interesting to note from the graph below that while 
the GDP growth in Connecticut has been on the lower side of that of the national level, it 
was higher than the national level in 2009 and 2010 - years of deep recession.  
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Connecticut’s GDP contracted by 3% in 2011, which adversely affected employment 
rates during that time. The significant decrease in economic activity may be reflective of 
high inflation in 2011. The unemployment rate has been rising for some time now; the 
current state of unemployment is alarming. 
 
In the next section, we formulate a methodology to forecast the unemployment rate in the 
next few months and analyze the output. 
Data and Methodology 
 
The data is sourced from Federal Reserve Economic Data - FRED - St. Louis Fed. The 
variable being studied is Connecticut’s unemployment rate. The data series is monthly in 
nature and ranges from January 1976 to January 2011. Our objective is to discover the 
unemployment rate until June 2011 and observe the trend. 
 
First, we plot the unemployment series to look for a trend. The graph below shows the 
trend in the unemployment rate over the entire data period. We see that the series is not 
following any particular trend. To check for the stationarity of the series, we run the 
Augment Dickey-Fuller test and the Philips-Perron test.  However, the test statistics from 
both the test show that the data series is not stationary. This brings us to our next step of 
analysis whereby we try to make the data series stationary for further analysis. 
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We take the first difference of the unemployment data and plot it against time to 
graphically check for stationarity.  
 
 
The graph above shows the graph of first difference of unemployment against time. It is 
evident that this data series is stationary in nature. This is confirmed by the results of 
Augmented Dickey-Fuller and Philips-Perron tests which reveal that the differenced 
series is stationary at 1% level of significance. 
 
Now that we have a stationary series, we go on to determine the model to be used. Based 
on the ACF and PACF as well as the AIC and SBIC criteria, we select two lags for the 
autoregressive equation. Further, we use Newey-West standard errors robust regression 
model for estimation. This is done to avoid the serial correlation among the error terms of 
the model. The results are discussed in the next section. 
 
Results and Discussion 
 
The regression results are shown in the table below. The table shows that first lag of the 
differenced series is positively related to the current period. Similarly, the lag is also 
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positively related to the current time period value, but the level of impact is lower that of 
the first lag. Both the coefficients are highly statistically significant. 
dunemp_conn Coef. Std. Err. t P>t [95% Conf. Int] 
L1. 0.4938265 0.047691 10.35 0 0.400097 0.587556 
L2. 0.3549381 0.044718 7.94 0 0.267052 0.442824 
_cons -0.0002176 0.003617 -0.06 0.95 -0.00733 0.006891 
 
In order to check for the autocorrelation among the error terms, we run the Q- White 
Noise test. The null hypothesis in this test is that there is no existence of white noise in 
the series. Therefore, a rejection of the null hypothesis shows that the series is not noise 
and hence there is no serial correlation. The results of our test reveal a p-value of 0, 
which means that we can reject the null hypothesis that the error terms are not white 
noise. Therefore, we can conclude that there is no serial correlation among the error 
terms. 
 
Armed with a robust model, we now forecast the unemployment rate for the months after 
January 2011. The results are shown below.  
Month Unemployment Rate in percent terms 
2011-01-01 9.40 
2011-02-01 9.25 
2011-03-01 9.19 
2011-04-01 9.14 
2011-05-01 9.10 
2011-06-01 9.06 
 
The results show that the unemployment rate will decline in the subsequent months. 
However, the rate of decline is very slow. The fall in the unemployment rate could be 
attributed to the recovery in the economy. As the national economy and economies 
worldwide recover the economic recession of 2008, productive activities will increase 
everywhere. The same will apply to Connecticut as well. However, the slow rate of fall in 
unemployment means that the economic activity is still not going to be enough. It is here 
that the government needs to intervene in the economy and provide impetus to the 
improving employment scenario. 
 
Government initiatives in terms of provision for better facilitation of job search, job 
creation through infrastructure work and other public welfare expenses in the form of 
construction and manufacturing can really provide the push the economy requires. 
Providing subsidies to the producers and manufacturers will also help promote productive 
activities. These will help generate additional employment opportunity while also boost 
demand in the economy. 
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III. Labor Market Developments 
by Gregory Ibe, Bradley Pierce 
 
 
Motivational research is a type of marketing research that attempts to explain why 
consumers behave as they do or in this case what the labor market outlook is for the 
state of Connecticut for 2013. The data for this research project was obtained on 
several websites one being the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis. Because this for 
the labor market development outlook for the state of Connecticut for the year 2013 
I only went back to 22 years to 1990 even going back this far I had some trouble 
finding some of the data. 
 
Job Openings in the North East: 
 
This variable will give us the percentages of job openings in the northeast. The more 
job openings there was in the northeast the better the labor market would be in 
Connecticut. I could not find job openings for the state of Connecticut alone so I 
went with the next best option, which was the northeast. The minimum for this was 
2% and the maximum was 3.1%. 
 
Connecticut Lending: 
 
This stat comes down to the percentage that banks are lending in the state of 
Connecticut. We believe that the more lending there is the more businesses are 
working and creating more jobs for people. The minimum was -1.47 percent and the 
maximum was 1.5 percent. 
 
Population: 
 
Population is the amount of people that are living the in state of Connecticut. The 
more people are living in an area the more people will use the resources around 
their area , which will create revenue for local businesses and lead to more hiring of 
employees. The minimum was 3433 in thousands of persons and the maximum was 
3591 in thousands of persons. 
 
Unemployment Benefits:  
 
After the recession many people were hired and laid off that lead to a spike in the 
amount of benefits they were receiving. This variable shows the amount of money 
that the State Government of Connecticut has given out yearly. We think that the 
more people are receiving in benefits the less the will be pressed to look for a job. 
The minimum for this was 486 and the maximum was 2396. 
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Our Analytical Model: 
 
In this model that is composed it will show the significance that is between my 
dependent and independent variables. 
 
Labor Market (employment) = Y-value 
 
The State of Connecticut Lending (CT_lending) = b1 
 
The percentage of job openings in the northeast (job_openings_NE) = b2 
 
The Population of the State of Connecticut (population) = b3 
 
The amount of unemployment benefits given out by the state of Connecticut 
(unemployment_benefits) = b4 
  
 
Our hypothesis for our project is that the labor market is on the upward swing. Our 
country is slowly getting out of a recession that hit our labor market and brought 
the state unemployment of Connecticut to a high what hasn’t been seen in decades.  
 
Variables  Expected Actual 
Connecticut Lending  Positive Negative 
Job Openings in North East Positive Positive 
Population  Positive Positive 
Unemployment Benefits Negative Negative 
 
 
 
 CT_LENDING JOB_OPENINGS_NE POPULATION 
UNEMPLOYMENT_
BENEFITS 
 Mean  0.605833  2.525000  3523.731  1101.250 
 Median  1.110000  2.500000  3522.365  838.5000 
 Maximum  1.500000  3.100000  3590.347  2396.000 
 Minimum -1.470000  2.000000  3432.835  486.0000 
 Std. Dev.  1.079069  0.304884  50.68856  693.7409 
 Skewness -0.960919  0.295253 -0.257709  0.809192 
 Kurtosis  2.361660  2.521057  2.024332  2.062747 
     
 Jarque-Bera  2.050472  0.289042  0.608792  1.748807 
 Probability  0.358712  0.865437  0.737569  0.417111 
     
 Sum  7.270000  30.30000  42284.77  13215.00 
 Sum Sq. Dev.  12.80829  1.022500  28262.63  5294040. 
     
 Observations  12  12  12  12 
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Dependent Variable: EMPLOYMENT  
Method: Least Squares   
Date: 05/01/13   Time: 22:31   
Sample (adjusted): 12 23   
Included observations: 12 after adjustments  
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     C 701.0139 324.2457 2.161983 0.0674 
CT_LENDING -11.72504 2.979102 -3.935764 0.0056 
JOB_OPENINGS_NE 34.87447 14.89634 2.341143 0.0518 
POPULATION 0.260548 0.092494 2.816925 0.0259 
UNEMPLOYMENT_BENEFITS -0.039436 0.008102 -4.867445 0.0018 
     
     R-squared 0.926977    Mean dependent var 1656.642 
Adjusted R-squared 0.885250    S.D. dependent var 29.62540 
S.E. of regression 10.03554    Akaike info criterion 7.744480 
Sum squared resid 704.9848    Schwarz criterion 7.946524 
Log likelihood -41.46688    Hannan-Quinn criter. 7.669676 
F-statistic 22.21511    Durbin-Watson stat 1.781052 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000447    
     
     
 
 
 
 
Dependent Variable: EMPLOYMENT  
Method: ML - ARCH (Marquardt) - Normal distribution 
Date: 05/01/13   Time: 23:29   
Sample (adjusted): 12 23   
Included observations: 12 after adjustments  
Convergence achieved after 29 iterations  
Presample variance: backcast (parameter = 0.7) 
GARCH = C(6) + C(7)*RESID(-1)^2 + C(8)*GARCH(-1) 
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error z-Statistic Prob.   
     
     C 700.4858 290.9314 2.407735 0.0161 
CT_LENDING -12.29407 5.070168 -2.424786 0.0153 
JOB_OPENINGS_NE 35.17249 11.04172 3.185417 0.0014 
POPULATION 0.261625 0.084662 3.090213 0.0020 
UNEMPLOYMENT_BENEFITS -0.040481 0.008049 -5.029351 0.0000 
     
     
 Variance Equation   
     
     C 42.78225 104.9168 0.407773 0.6834 
RESID(-1)^2 -0.891226 2.702397 -0.329791 0.7416 
GARCH(-1) 1.213832 1.904239 0.637437 0.5238 
     
     R-squared 0.918062    Mean dependent var 1656.642 
Adjusted R-squared 0.871240    S.D. dependent var 29.62540 
S.E. of regression 10.63053    Akaike info criterion 8.029059 
Sum squared resid 791.0572    Schwarz criterion 8.352330 
Log likelihood -40.17435    Hannan-Quinn criter. 7.909372 
Durbin-Watson stat 1.672751    
     
     
 
 
Pairwise Granger Causality Tests 
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Date: 05/01/13   Time: 23:36 
Sample: 1 23  
Lags: 2   
    
    
 Null Hypothesis: Obs F-Statistic Prob.  
    
    
 JOB_OPENINGS_NE does not Granger Cause CT_LENDING  10  0.56981 0.5985 
 CT_LENDING does not Granger Cause JOB_OPENINGS_NE  0.58179 0.5927 
    
    
 POPULATION does not Granger Cause CT_LENDING  21  3.21186 0.0672 
 CT_LENDING does not Granger Cause POPULATION  0.56241 0.5807 
    
    
 UNEMPLOYMENT_BENEFITS does not Granger Cause CT_LENDING  21  0.36609 0.6991 
 CT_LENDING does not Granger Cause UNEMPLOYMENT_BENEFITS  16.4341 0.0001 
    
    
 POPULATION does not Granger Cause JOB_OPENINGS_NE  10  5.21066 0.0599 
 JOB_OPENINGS_NE does not Granger Cause POPULATION  3.04275 0.1366 
    
    
 UNEMPLOYMENT_BENEFITS does not Granger Cause JOB_OPENINGS_NE  10  0.55177 0.6074 
 JOB_OPENINGS_NE does not Granger Cause UNEMPLOYMENT_BENEFITS  0.19126 0.8317 
    
    
 UNEMPLOYMENT_BENEFITS does not Granger Cause POPULATION  21  0.34586 0.7128 
 POPULATION does not Granger Cause UNEMPLOYMENT_BENEFITS  2.28000 0.1345 
    
    
 
 
Scatter Plot 
The Graph shows a decreasing trend in the lending as the GDP grows and a very 
stable taxes in Connecticut. The decline in Lending in Ct can’t be a good sign for the 
development of jobs because in order to increase in size, companies need to borrow 
funds and being that the taxes have been stable in terms of its percentage change 
from year to year, the lending shouldn’t show such a drastic downward trend with 
the increase of GDP as stated in earlier OLS regression.  
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Unit Root test 
 
Null Hypothesis: EMPLOYMENT has a unit root  
Exogenous: Constant   
Lag Length: 1 (Automatic based on SIC, MAXLAG=4) 
     
     
   t-Statistic   Prob.* 
     
     Augmented Dickey-Fuller test statistic -2.633649  0.1023 
Test critical values: 1% level  -3.788030  
 5% level  -3.012363  
 10% level  -2.646119  
     
     
*MacKinnon (1996) one-sided p-values.  
     
 
Employment- It isn’t significant at a 5% level with the ADF test, but becomes 
significant when differenced by 1.  
 
 
Null Hypothesis: JOB_OPENINGS_NE has a unit root 
Exogenous: Constant   
Lag Length: 1 (Automatic based on SIC, MAXLAG=2) 
     
     
   t-Statistic   Prob.* 
     
     Augmented Dickey-Fuller test statistic -2.428241  0.1583 
Test critical values: 1% level  -4.297073  
 5% level  -3.212696  
 10% level  -2.747676  
     
     
 
 Job Opening in Northeast was insignificant at level and barely became significant at 
a 5% level when differenced.  
 
 
Null Hypothesis: POPULATION has a unit root  
Exogenous: Constant   
Lag Length: 0 (Automatic based on SIC, MAXLAG=4) 
     
     
   t-Statistic   Prob.* 
     
     Augmented Dickey-Fuller test statistic  0.063562  0.9550 
Test critical values: 1% level  -3.769597  
 5% level  -3.004861  
 10% level  -2.642242  
     
     
*MacKinnon (1996) one-sided p-values.  
 
Population as expected was very insignificant at level  which accepts the Null but 
surprisingly when differenced became significant at the 5% level.  
 
 
Null Hypothesis: UNEMPLOYMENT_BENEFITS has a unit root 
Exogenous: Constant   
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Lag Length: 1 (Automatic based on SIC, MAXLAG=4) 
     
     
   t-Statistic   Prob.* 
     
     Augmented Dickey-Fuller test statistic -2.379202  0.1590 
Test critical values: 1% level  -3.788030  
 5% level  -3.012363  
 10% level  -2.646119  
     
     
 
Unemployment Benefits also proves to be the same as the 3 listed above.  
 
RECALIBRATED OLS MODEL.  
(differenced) 
 
Dependent Variable: D(EMPLOYMENT)  
Method: Least Squares   
Date: 05/02/13   Time: 00:42   
Sample (adjusted): 13 23   
Included observations: 11 after adjustments  
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     C 9.789584 14.81692 0.660703 0.5333 
CT_LENDING -5.462785 10.56736 -0.516949 0.6237 
D(JOB_OPENINGS_NE) 12.36907 34.53246 0.358187 0.7325 
D(POPULATION) -0.294558 1.104290 -0.266740 0.7986 
D(UNEMPLOYMENT_BENEFITS) -0.053477 0.018010 -2.969370 0.0250 
     
     R-squared 0.805832    Mean dependent var -3.845455 
Adjusted R-squared 0.676387    S.D. dependent var 27.39016 
S.E. of regression 15.58144    Akaike info criterion 8.632993 
Sum squared resid 1456.688    Schwarz criterion 8.813855 
Log likelihood -42.48146    Hannan-Quinn criter. 8.518986 
F-statistic 6.225271    Durbin-Watson stat 1.028312 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.025017    
     
     
 
The Optimized stationary model even though has decent robustness in the Adjusted 
R-squared, it shows every coefficient to be insignificant possibly signaling some 
serial correlation.   
The addition of ARMA to help create a better forecast is needed as the chart details 
the ARMA (1,1) model due to the small sample size of our observation.  
 
ARMA  AR(0) AR(1) 
MA(0) 8.632993 8.688251 
MA(1) 7.895812 7.7704323 
 
 
After running the model, ARMA(1,1) produced the lowest AIC and also had the 
highest log-likelihood making it a staple in or regression but, we still are presented 
with a rather insufficient model as the coefficients all still remain insignificant.  
 
Dependent Variable: D(EMPLOYMENT)  
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Method: Least Squares   
Date: 05/02/13   Time: 00:57   
Sample (adjusted): 14 23   
Included observations: 10 after adjustments  
Failure to improve SSR after 24 iterations  
MA Backcast: 13   
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     C -4.489547 16.85900 -0.266300 0.8073 
CT_LENDING -3.027181 7.739927 -0.391112 0.7218 
D(JOB_OPENINGS_NE) 15.34361 12.45254 1.232167 0.3057 
D(POPULATION) 0.503949 1.303146 0.386717 0.7248 
D(UNEMPLOYMENT_BENEFITS) -0.055986 0.011103 -5.042303 0.0150 
AR(1) 0.517737 0.656230 0.788957 0.4877 
MA(1) 0.997033 0.622011 1.602918 0.2073 
     
     R-squared 0.953337    Mean dependent var -2.600000 
Adjusted R-squared 0.860011    S.D. dependent var 28.54155 
S.E. of regression 10.67884    Akaike info criterion 7.770432 
Sum squared resid 342.1128    Schwarz criterion 7.982242 
Log likelihood -31.85216    Hannan-Quinn criter. 7.538078 
F-statistic 10.21515    Durbin-Watson stat 1.380456 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.041671    
     
     
 
 
 
 
 Forcasted model with ARMA (1,1)- Examining this shows the regular model to be 
the slightly better forecast because of the lower bias proportion, variance 
proportion and covariance proportion.  The forecasts both show high volatility in its 
trends as it could either drown the workforce by 300000 workers or gain the same.  
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EMPLOYMENTF ± 2 S.E.
Forecast: EMPLOYMENTF
Actual: EMPLOYMENT
Forecast sample: 1 23
Adjusted sample: 14 23
Included observations: 10
Root Mean Squared Error 33.95693
Mean Absolute Error      29.93642
Mean Abs. Percent Error 1.813388
Theil Inequality Coefficient  0.010341
     Bias Proportion         0.484405
     Variance Proportion  0.079467
     Covariance Proportion  0.436128
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REGULAR MODEL 
 
CONCLUSION- 
 Our concluding formula would be:  
D(employment)= 9.78958C -5.4627LENDING +12.369 D(JOB Op)-
0.294D(population)-0.0534D(UNEMPBEN) 
The data was hard to acquire to implement a significant forecast especially being 
that some of the coefficients weren’t recorded therefore making it hard for our 
coefficients to be significant. However, must of our hypothesis in the end the 
mindset in which we had in mind stuck through with the exception of lending. The 
CT state department seems to think that the annual employment growth from 2010 
until 2020 will 1876 jobs. In order for that to happen, the lending as a result of high 
GDP output by the state have to keep on its trend of reducing. The less we lend in CT 
the more companies have at their exposal to employ someone instead of pay the 
bills. The Unemployment rate of course with its inverse relationship to employment 
has to continue to reduce. The population is a tricky one because the availability of 
people usually means more competition and more people employed, but also means 
that more people go unemployed, therefore leaving a quandary for the labor 
markets. Finally Job opportunities has to grow, which goes alongside the lending, 
because when companies don’t have debt to pay, they are willing to employ 
additional staff in order to expand rather than contract.  The graph of employment 
had been showing a drastic downward trend, but due to the recent economic surge 
CT was able to bounce back from the horrendous recessionary periods only to see 
high levels of increase in the labor force.  
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13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23
EMPLOYMENTF ± 2 S.E.
Forecast: EMPLOYMENTF
Actual: EMPLOYMENT
Forecast sample: 1 23
Adjusted sample: 13 23
Included observations: 11
Root Mean Squared Error 17.69925
Mean Absolute Error      14.57497
Mean Abs. Percent Error 0.877825
Theil Inequality Coefficient  0.005364
     Bias Proportion         0.283348
     Variance Proportion  0.000233
     Covariance Proportion  0.716419
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IV. State Budget Revenue Outlook 
by Salvatore Cerami, John Chiarelli, Frank Howard  
 
 
 
Dependent Variable: REV   
Method: Least Squares   
Date: 05/01/13   Time: 21:00   
Sample: 1 15    
Included observations: 15   
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     C 22.21309 3.096298 7.174079 0.0000 
LGUMP -3.014251 1.091169 -2.762406 0.0200 
WAGE -0.000968 0.000267 -3.621774 0.0047 
GDP 0.000224 0.000101 2.223316 0.0504 
PCPI 0.000795 0.000341 2.335491 0.0417 
     
     R-squared 0.585867    Mean dependent var 13.41133 
Adjusted R-squared 0.420214    S.D. dependent var 1.093460 
S.E. of regression 0.832601    Akaike info criterion 2.732677 
Sum squared resid 6.932242    Schwarz criterion 2.968693 
Log likelihood -15.49508    Hannan-Quinn criter. 2.730163 
F-statistic 3.536710    Durbin-Watson stat 2.596428 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.047865    
     
     
 
Dependent Variable: REV   
Method: ML - ARCH (Marquardt) - Normal distribution 
Date: 05/01/13   Time: 21:35   
Sample: 1 15    
Included observations: 15   
Convergence achieved after 23 iterations  
Presample variance: backcast (parameter = 0.7) 
GARCH = C(6) + C(7)*RESID(-1)^2 + C(8)*GARCH(-1) 
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error z-Statistic Prob.   
     
     C 21.97813 3.112013 7.062352 0.0000 
LGUMP -2.830454 0.960466 -2.946959 0.0032 
WAGE -0.000875 0.000213 -4.101757 0.0000 
GDP 0.000235 0.000159 1.480451 0.1388 
PCPI 0.000581 0.000573 1.014041 0.3106 
     
     
 Variance Equation   
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C -0.035609 0.113077 -0.314912 0.7528 
RESID(-1)^2 -0.210462 1.025573 -0.205214 0.8374 
GARCH(-1) 1.520009 1.348913 1.126840 0.2598 
     
     R-squared 0.564600    Mean dependent var 13.41133 
Adjusted R-squared 0.390441    S.D. dependent var 1.093460 
S.E. of regression 0.853711    Akaike info criterion 2.628049 
Sum squared resid 7.288229    Schwarz criterion 3.005676 
Log likelihood -11.71037    Hannan-Quinn criter. 2.624027 
F-statistic 1.852487    Durbin-Watson stat 2.617454 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.181604    
     
     
 
 
 The regressions that we ran provided some results that help us in understanding 
the effects of the independent variables on state revenue. We ran a regression using the 
least squares method, this provides some accurate results because it eliminates the effect 
of missing variables or an incomplete sample. When analyzing the regression we noticed 
a couple of things that give us very good insights on this model. Both unemployment and 
wage had an indirect correlation with the state revenue. As the unemployment increased 
by 1%, the state revenue decreased by 2.38%. This is to be expected because 
unemployment has always been a big indicator of the how a country or state or 
performing financially. When running the T-test we could see that this variable is 
significant in the 95% level.  When analyzing the wage variable we can see the indirect 
correlation of this and the state revenue. The impact of it was not as big as the one with 
unemployment because it had a very small coefficient of -0.00096. However this has the 
bias that we expected and it also was significant at the 99% level. Even thou it has a very 
small coefficient it should not be ignored because when running sensitivity tests its 
impact in the model were noticeable. The next two variables had a positive correlation 
with state revenue. This all had the bias that we predicted because as GDP and PCPI go 
up the state revenue is expected to go up. Like expected these variables also had small 
coefficients, because there are many other variables in the model that are not being 
measured in this study. What is important to point out is that we got the bias that we 
expected, both of them were significant at a 95% level, and we can get an estimate to see 
how it affects state revenue. We got an R^2 of .58 which means our model does indeed 
represent a good portion of what happens in reality. We had hope to get a little higher 
than this but it is to be expected when running a regression that has so many variables. 
 
 
 
The next regression we ran was using the ML - ARCH model. This is very useful 
when running a model were the data constantly change. We decided that it would be good 
for us to run the model because it would take care of some uncertainties created by our 
original one. When we analyze it we can see that that we got very similar results than the 
regressions previously discussed. The bias for both unemployment and wages was what 
we expected, both of them had a negative correlation once again with unemployment 
having a very big coefficient of 2.83%. When looking at the z scores we could see that 
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both of them were highly significant with extremely good provability scores. The next 
two variables GDP and PCPI both gave us the expected result having a direct correlation 
with state revenue. Similarly to the least square model they both had small coefficients, 
however we could see that the variable were not as significant as we had hoped they were 
a little bit over the 10% level. These are not bad scores and we decided that the impacts 
of our variables do need to be considered when running the model. The R^2 was .57; 
which is to be expected and it shows that the model we ran is accurate, but could use a 
few other variables. 
 
 
 
       This next graph we found to be extremely useful and surprisingly accurate. Here we 
forecast our Revenue as a percentage of state GDP within 2 standard deviations of 
forecast. What we find most interesting about this graph is the year in which our data 
takes a significant dip. Ten years into our graph our government revenue sharply starts to 
tumble downward. It comes to no surprise that these were the start of the recessionary 
years for the United States of America and the state of Connecticut also felt its impact. 
There are a few reasons for this downward spiral. First off we can blame the 
unemployment rate. As our data shows, the unemployment rate for the state was at 4.6 in 
the year 2007. At the 10 value on the horizontal axis of our graph you see that our REV 
number is at highest. What also should be noted is our other variables were also at their 
highest during this time period. Per capita personal income(55,859) and GDP for the state 
of CT (221,133,000) were at their climax. During the next 3 years unemployment jumped 
from 4.6 to 9.3 in 2010. This was the highest unemployment has ever been in the state 
and is showed by the minimum point in our graph at the 13 year mark. The Department 
of Labor showed there were 119,000 publically lost jobs in the state, with an additional 
16,000 state jobs lost.  At its low point, which came in the fourth quarter of 2009, was 
supposed to be a GDP of $204.5 billion. But new data show the state's rock bottom of 
economic output was actually about 7 percent lower, coming in just above $190 billion. 
Our numbers that you see in the chart to the right show a Theil Inequality Coefficient of 
0.0259. As a rule, the closer this number is to zero, the more accurate a projection is. We 
are pleased with this number and believe that our graph not only shows a correlation to 
Connecticut’s economic health but the nations as well. As you may have noticed the REV 
number is creeping back upward and today it is back to the 1997 level. As for the future 
we remain unsure about the future of the CT state revenue for many reasons however one 
statistic is holds our hopes at rest. The job market in CT is not growing. Over the past 2 
10
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REVF ± 2 S.E.
Forecast: REVF
Actual: REV
Forecast sample: 1 15
Included observations: 15
Root Mean Squared Error 0.697052
Mean Absolute Error      0.508701
Mean Abs. Percent Error 3.918897
Theil Inequality Coefficient  0.025947
     Bias Proportion         0.000732
     Variance Proportion  0.236467
     Covariance Proportion  0.762801
.2
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decades the job market has only grown 1.8%, and today there are fewer jobs in CT than 
there were in 1988. In order to boost our revenue number we would have to entice the 
citizens to spend or raise taxes. With little to no job creation in the coming 18 months, 
according to Governor Dannel Malloy, "The new understanding of the depths from which 
we are recovering re-enforces ... the absolute necessity for Connecticut to pursue 
aggressive policies and sustained investments to accelerate recovery and job creation" 
says Malloy. For this we believe our graph to be accurate and expect a leveling off of 
growth for the State revenue budget for Connecticut.  
 
 
 
 
Null Hypothesis: REV has a unit root  
Exogenous: Constant   
Lag Length: 3 (Automatic based on SIC, MAXLAG=3) 
     
     
   t-Statistic   Prob.* 
     
     Augmented Dickey-Fuller test statistic -3.953914  0.0147 
Test critical values: 1% level  -4.200056  
 5% level  -3.175352  
 10% level  -2.728985  
     
     
*MacKinnon (1996) one-sided p-values.  
Warning: Probabilities and critical values calculated for 20 observations 
 
 
        In order to find out whether or not our data was stationary or non-stationary we 
had to perform a unit root test on our dependent variable REV (state revenue as a 
percentage of Connecticut’s GDP). It is important to know this because it depends 
on what kind of testing we can perform on our variables. When data is stationary we 
can use OLS (ordinary least squared) testing. When data is non-stationary we would 
need to transform the data by differencing. To find out what type of data we have we 
chose to do an Augmented Dickey-Fuller test (ADF). According to our results we 
would reject the null hypothesis at the 5% and 10% levels. We can say this for sure 
because our t-statistical calculated values at theselevels(-3.175 and -2.7289)  are 
bigger larger than the t-critical value of -3.953. Our conclusion that our REV 
variable is stationary is further verified by our p-value of .0147. This number 
signifies that our data is stationary at the 5% level.  
 
 
       In terms of the current state budget outlook in Connecticut,  two very crucial areas of 
focus are noted as “rising revenues and shrinking expenditures.”  Furthermore,  in terms 
of monitoring this outlook,  another focal area will be noted on April 15th when the states 
reviews tax filings,  while will represent the position of the economy statewide.  
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      Another note on this outlook comes from the level of spending statewide during this 
fiscal year.  “Lembo noted that spending growth has been minimal for most of the current 
fiscal year, and that effort is helping to diminish the red ink”. 
 
      Furthermore, sales tax, income tax, and other tax receipts should not drop below 
expectations for the sale of improving Connecticut’s budget outlook.  Another proposal 
for the sake of improving this current condition will come as a result of spending cuts.  
“Primarily to social services, new tax revenues from businesses, power plants, and 
spending” .  
 
      Another reliable good source of information relative to this project came from Tom 
Foley.  His input here will support the presence of our GDP variable.  Foley states that he 
“expected 40% of the problem – about 1.5 Billion – to be solved economic growth alone. 
Income sales and other taxes would raise more because additional people would be 
working, getting raises, and spending more”. 
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V. The Housing Market: Expecting a Rebound? 
by  James D’Elia, Dominick Livia 
 
Technical Analysis of the Connecticut Housing Market 
 
Internal Analysis of Connecticut Housing Market 
 
 Historically speaking, the Connecticut housing market has flourished in 
relation to the United States housing market. However, in recent years the housing 
market has taken a serious hit, primarily in thanks to the housing bubble of 2008, 
which ultimately lead to an economic recession. The effects of this recession were 
noticeable across the entire housing market, as it affected housing starts, home 
ownership, home vacancy and housing prices. While Connecticut seemed to fair 
better than the rest of the United States, due to its wealth as a state (consistently 
ranked in the top 5 in median household income), it was not able to escape the 
housing bubble unscathed.  
 
 
 
 One area where Connecticut has seen a visible decline is the area of privately 
owned housing starts. Since the year 2007, Connecticut has seen a 56% decrease in 
privately owned housing starts (annually). Even more alarming is that there was a 
visible decline even before the housing crisis, as from 2002 through 2007 there was 
a 38% decrease in new housing starts. It is clear that Connecticut housing starts 
were already on a declining path, and that this housing bubble seemed to accelerate 
this downward movement. Additionally, the Connecticut privately owned housing 
starts market appears to have positive correlation with the United States privately 
owned housing starts market. Since 2006, every year the United States market 
appreciated, so did the Connecticut market, and every year that the United States 
market depreciated, so did the Connecticut. This is significant, because if the United 
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States housing market as a whole does not rebound, than one cannot expect 
Connecticut’s market to have a significant rebound either.  
 
 
 
 
 
 Recently, Connecticut has experienced unfamiliar growth is in the home 
vacancy rate. The average home vacancy rate from 1986 through 2004 in 
Connecticut was 1.4, and for the United States it was 1.6. In 2005, the home vacancy 
rate for Connecticut was 1.3%, and the United States home vacancy rate was 1.9%. 
However, since 2005 it has risen to 2.2% in Connecticut (peaking at 2.3% since the 
housing bubble) and 2.5% Nationally (peaking at 2.8% during the housing bubble). 
These may seem insignificant, but they are appreciations of 69% in Connecticut and 
32% in the United States. If the home vacancy rates continue to appreciate at this 
level, it will not bode well for the Connecticut housing market, as well as the United 
States housing market as a whole. More vacant homes will create a market surplus, 
and drive down housing prices even further, something that the market can ill 
afford to experience. However, the depreciation in home prices should help return 
the home vacancy rates to equilibrium, as the availability of affordable homes will 
allow higher occupancy.  
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 Perhaps the most significant issues Connecticut has faced are within the 
House Price Index. Historically, Connecticut has ranked in the upper echelon of 
states in terms of housing prices. Over the last 37 years, Connecticut homes have 
been priced 23% above the national average, peaking at 78% in the late 1980’s. 
From 1975 through 2007, Connecticut averaged a 7% annual inflation in housing 
prices, and only experienced 7 years of deflation in the housing price index. 
Additionally, these 7 years of deflation maintained low levels, often around 1-2%. 
However, since 2007, Connecticut has experienced deflation in housing prices 
during every single year, averaging -4% annually. This has seen the housing price 
index drop from 469.10 to 392.21 (a 16.4% decline).  Connecticut is not alone in this 
dilemma, as the national housing price index has also seen significant deflation. In 
2007, the national housing price index maintained a level of 375.73. Since 2007, this 
number has depreciated to 314.22, a decline of 16.3%. This is primarily due to the 
housing bubble and recent economic recession. However, this is extremely 
significant, because it shows that while Connecticut housing prices have historically 
experienced superior inflation relative to the national housing price index, during 
times of economic hardship Connecticut is susceptible to the same deflation as the 
rest of the nation. This does not bode well for Connecticut, as the national housing 
market has yet to show signs of a rebound any time soon. 
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 The final section analyzed within the technical analysis is the Connecticut 
home ownership rate. Since 1984, Connecticut has maintained an average home 
ownership rate of 68.9%. In comparison, the United States home ownership rate 
during the same time span is 66.0%, further solidifying Connecticut’s superiority in 
the housing market. Surprisingly, Connecticut’s Home Ownership rates have seen 
little depreciation due to the recent housing bubble. In 2007, the Connecticut home 
ownership rate was 70.3%. Since then, Connecticut has actually seen an 
appreciation in the home ownership rate, reaching 70.6% in 2011. This could be 
attribute to housing prices falling, making it easier and more affordable for people 
to live in Connecticut. However, the national home ownership rates did not share 
the same success. In 2007 the national home ownership rate reached 68.1%, above 
the historical average. However, since 2007 it has depreciated every year and is now 
at 66.1%.  
 
External Analysis of the Connecticut Housing Market 
 
 While there are several internal factors that drive the Connecticut housing 
market, there are other external factors that also play a huge role in the efficiency of 
the market. These factors include Gross Domestic Product, Unemployment Rates, 
United States Mortgage Rates, and Per Capita Disposable Income. Historically, when 
these elements are in cohesion, the United States Housing Market has thrived, as 
well as Connecticut’s. However, recently several of these factors have been thrown 
out of equilibrium, primarily due to the housing crisis of 2008.  
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 One factor that is essential to not only the housing market, but the entire 
economy of the United States & Connecticut is the Gross Domestic Product. Gross 
Domestic Product can be defined as the output of goods and services produced by 
labor and property located in the United States. Perhaps the most significant 
measure of Gross Domestic Product is the GDP Growth rate on an annual basis, as it 
represents the level at which a company is improving its Gross Domestic Product 
and expanding itself economically. Historically speaking, both the United States and 
Connecticut has enjoyed high levels of GDP Growth. From 1997 through 2007, the 
United States has sustained average GDP growth of 5.35% (Seasonally Adjusted), 
and Connecticut has sustained an average GDP growth of 4.92% (Seasonally 
Adjusted). However, since the crisis of 2008, that level has plummeted to 1.85% for 
the United States and 1.04% for Connecticut. Additionally, there is little optimism 
that the United States will ever get back to the high 5.35% levels that it maintained 
in the past, meaning that the housing market may never experience a significant 
rebound to where it was 10 years ago.  
 
 Another essential factor to both the economy and the housing market is the 
unemployment rate. Unemployment measures the rate of workforce members who 
are unemployed and actively seeking jobs. Historically, when economies have 
performed well, the unemployment rate exhibits a natural rate, consisting only 
frictional and structural unemployment (essentially, unavoidable unemployment).  
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In the United States, the historical average for unemployment since 1976 is 6.5%. 
However, this has not been a steady 6.5%, as there has been much fluctuating of this 
rate, peaking at 10.8% in the early 1980’s and dropping to as low as 3.8% in 2000. 
However, recently we have seen a rise in unemployment, as since the crisis of 2008 
we have seen an average unemployment rate of 8.7%, and a current rate of 7.6% in 
March of 2013. To put this into perspective, in the 10 years approaching the crisis, 
the highest level of unemployment in the United States was 6.3%, with an average of 
4.9%. While Connecticut has historically maintained lower levels of unemployment 
than the United States (5.4% since 1976) the state was not able to escape the crisis 
of 2008 unharmed. Since the crisis of 2008, Connecticut has maintained an average 
unemployment rate of 8.4%, three percentage points higher than its historical 
average.  However, Connecticut has seen a downward trend in unemployment 
levels, as unemployment now stands at 8.0% in March 2013.  If this trend can 
continue, it bodes well for Connecticut, because if employment rises, the need for 
homes will rise as well.  
 
 
 The external force that is most closely related to the housing market is the 
United States Mortgage Rate. Mortgage Rates are often a function of several 
economic factors, such as inflation, interest rates, GDP, unemployment rates, 
behavior of equity and bond markets, CPI and PPI. Taking all this into consideration, 
the United States has historically held much higher home mortgage rates than it 
does today. However, while low rates may allow people easier access to homes, the 
lower rates do not guarantee success for the market. In March 2013, the United 
States 30-year mortgage rate was 3.57%, well below the historical average of 8.64%. 
However, due to extremely low interest rates (10 Year-Treasury Rate of 1.66%) 
coupled with a significant decline in the ease to obtain a mortgage loan, the market 
has not been able to benefit from these low rates. These mortgage rates are 
expected to remain low in the near future, allowing for a potential rebound if 
economic conditions strengthen.  
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 The final external factor analyzed is the Per Capita Disposable Income. In 
theory, the more disposable income people hold, the better the housing market 
performs, as houses become more affordable. This holds true, as Connecticut has 
maintained Disposable Income Rates 25.6% higher than the national average since 
1959, leading to a superior housing market. Recently this discrepancy has become 
even more apparent, as Connecticut has been above 30% over the national average 
since 2006. This bodes well for Connecticut ,as they seem like the most likely 
candidate (if any) to experience a rebound in the housing market, due to their 
abundance of disposable wealth.  
 
Fundamental Analysis of Housing Market in Connecticut 
 
 Overall, Connecticut has managed to sustain some success in the early goings 
of 2013. In the first quarter of 2013, pending sales of single-family homes rose 
17.1% over the first quarter of 2012. While 2012 was one of the worst years in 
recent memory, its is significant to note that the market is beginning to rebound. 
Additionally, deposits on condominiums rose 29% to 1790 contracts, which is the 
highest total in the last three years. This is vital, as it signifies that the drop in price 
for homes in Connecticut is finally met by an increased demand (sales up 8.8% from 
a year ago), positive signs for the market. In addition to this, recently financial 
institutions have began approving more housing loans. While the “zero down 
payment” loan is most likely extinct, loans will be more accessible to the average 
person. Median prices in Connecticut have also stabilized in the first quarter, due to 
a full year of consistent growth in both the number of deposits and the number of 
closings. This consistent growth is the key to prices approaching levels of 
equilibrium, and it remains to be seen if this growth can be maintained for 
successive years.  
 
 While there were several positive market movements from the first quarter 
of 2013, there also were several negative indicators. Even though single-family 
home  sales rose and condominium deposits rose, the rental market took a hit, with 
rental leases dropping by 2.6%. This possibly has correlation with the rise in 
housing sales, as more people are finally able to afford houses due to the low prices. 
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Additionally, foreclosures in Connecticut continued to rise, as they have the 7th 
highest rate in the country, and 2nd in New England behind Maine. Lastly, 
Connecticut’s luxury market has remained unchanged, thus furthering the theory 
that people are seeking the most affordable homes in Connecticut. If the demand for 
affordable homes continues to rise, than eventually so will housing prices, and the 
market will correct itself. This self-correction could stunt the growth within the 
housing market in Connecticut and lead to further issues.  
 
  
 
Forecast of the Connecticut Housing Market 
 
 As a whole, there are both positive indicators and negative indicators 
surrounding the state of the Connecticut Housing Market. Internally, Connecticut 
appears to be in significantly better shape than the United States in terms of 
Housing. However, that is not very significant, as both are still feeling the ill effects 
of the crisis of 2008. Externally, the United States is not where it should be 
economically, and until it sustains any form of long-term success, any excessive 
optimism must be curbed. However, positive signs are present so far in 2013, as the 
stock market has performed well (S&P 500 up near record highs of  $1,597), the 
United States Dollar has appreciated significantly, Unemployment is down in April 
(7.5%) due to the creation of 165,000 jobs and the housing market seems to be 
heading in the right direction. Fundamentally, Connecticut has shown signs of 
rebounding, but these rebounds are in very small sample sizes, and must be 
maintained in order to consider Connecticut’s Housing Market Stable.   
 
Based on all these factors, one cannot expect any significant growth in 
Connecticut’s Housing Market in the near future. A more realistic expectation would 
be slight growth in 2013, stimulated by lower unemployment rates, lower housing 
prices, GDP Growth, high levels of disposable income, an improved single-family 
home market and increased deposits on condominiums. This slight growth in 2013 
would most likely be followed by increased confidence in the years following, which 
could stimulate a significant rebound in the Housing Market. All of this is growth is 
dependent on the state of the United States Economy, which appears to be 
recovering at a slow pace.  
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The Financial Sector: Connecticut’s Comparative Advantage? 
by Vincent D’Agnese & Gregory Nunn 
Employment in National Commercial Banks: 
 
 Employment in national commercial banks rose from 1.719 billion 
employees in 2002 to 1.961 employees currently today. Over this ten-year span, we 
saw an increase of 14% in national commercial bank employment. 
 
Employment in Connecticut Commercial Banks: 
 
 Employment in Connecticut commercial banks rose from 1.224 million 
employees in 2002 to 4.094 employees currently today. Over this ten-year span, we 
saw an increase of 234% in Connecticut commercial bank employment.  
 
Total Bank Assets in National Commercial Banks: 
 
 Total national commercial bank assets were 6.488 trillion dollars in 2002, 
compared to 13.391 trillion currently today. Over this ten year span, we saw total 
bank assets in national commercial banks rise 106%. 
 
Total Bank Assets in Connecticut Commercial Banks: 
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 Total Connecticut commercial bank assets were 3.932 billion in 2002, 
compared to 27.176 billion currently today. Over this ten year span, we saw total 
bank assets in Connecticut commercial banks rise 591%. 
 
 
What does this mean? 
 
 Over the past ten years we have seen a robust increase in assets among all 
commercial banks in the United States. This increase is a direct cause from a weaker 
supply of credit within commercial banks. Since the recent financial crisis in 2008, 
we have seen a weaker credit supply for mortgage loans as well as declining interest 
rates across the board. This activity may suggest an end to some of the asset 
dumping that took place during the recession, when banks that chased growth as 
they made loans and collected deposits, freeze.  
 
 As total bank assets soared, we saw the United States government step in and 
adopt a few programs that were designed to strengthen the financial sector. In 2008, 
President George W. Bush signed the Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP) into 
law. This program, as well as the Quantitative Easing Programs that we have seen, 
are simply components of government measures to address the subprime mortgage 
crisis.  
 
Simple Leverage Ratio in National Commercial Banks: 
 
 Simple leverage was measured by total bank assets to total equity capital. 
Throughout 2002 to 2004 we saw 10x leverage among national commercial banks. 
Since then, national commercial banks are currently leveraged at 8.91x. 
 
Simple Leverage Ratio in Connecticut Commercial Banks: 
 
 Connecticut commercial banks have averaged right around 8x leverage 
throughout the past ten years. We have seen a slight increase in Connecticut 
commercial leverage currently hanging around 9.92x leveraged.  
 
National vs. Connecticut: 
 
 Connecticut banks are more leveraged when compared to that of national 
banks and it would be correct to assume that Connecticut banks may be more 
exposed to interest rate risk. If the Federal Reserve were to raise interest rates, 
Connecticut banks will most likely suffer a sharper decline in assets compared to 
that of national commercial banks simply because they are highly leveraged.  
 
Solvency Indication: 
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 Since the recent financial crisis, it is reasonable to assume that the financial 
crisis currently experienced by U.S. commercial banks was one of solvency. Solvency 
is often referred to as solvency risk and is what banks consider long-term viability. 
If a commercial bank takes on bad loans or its security portfolio declines in value, 
then its capital accounts, which are designed to absorb these losses, become 
stressed. As investors and depositors become aware that this is going on, they may 
withdraw their funds and the bank will become insolvent and most likely fail. 
Solvency among commercial banks was measure by comparing tier 1 capital to risk 
weighted assets. It could also be calculated by tier 1 & 2 capital to total risk 
weighted assets.  
 The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision has issued Basel II and Basel III 
scenarios, which are recommendations on banking laws and regulations. These 
were intended to create an international standard for banking regulators to control 
how much capital banks need to put aside to guard against the types of financial and 
operational risks banks face.  
 
National vs. Connecticut: 
 
 Nationally, we have seen an increase in solvency over the past ten years from 
10% to 12.8% currently. In the state of Connecticut we have seen a decrease in 
solvency that peeked in late 2003 at around 19% to its current level of 13.6%. 
Solvency is trending downward in Connecticut when compared to that of national 
commercial banks. From these numbers, we can see that commercial banks are 
meeting Basel III requirements, but barely. There is still room for improvement in 
solvency among commercial banks.  
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 Tier 1 capital is the core measure of a bank’s financial strength from a 
regulator’s point of view. This is composed of core capital, which consists primarily 
of common stock and retained earnings.  
 
Asset Quality: 
 
 Asset quality in commercial banks is calculated from taking non-current 
loans and leases to total bank assets. Nationally, we saw a peak in asset quality in 
2010 before dropping down to its current level of 1.91%. In the state of Connecticut 
we also saw asset quality peak in 2010 before falling to its current level of 1.2%. 
National banks currently have a better overall quality of assets than that of banks in 
Connecticut.  
 The recent decline in asset quality could be directly attributed to the high 
amount of foreclosures as well as the current weak supply of credit among these 
institutions. Asset quality has fallen since the crisis due to extravagant lending prior 
to the recession.  
 
Connecticut’s People’s United Bank & Webster Bank: 
 
 Asset quality and profitability conditions of Connecticut’s two largest banks 
outperform those for the average U.S. banks. While the average national ratio of 
non-current (past 90 days due) loans to total loans was reported at 3.66% for the 
US, it was considerably lower for People’s United Bank at 2.0% and Webster at 
1.61% (based on Federal Reserve Bank Regulatory Data for Q4 2012). People’s has 
been more profitable than the average national banks, with its net interest margin 
(NIM) reaching 3.93% in Q4 2012. At the same time, Webster’s NIM was at 3.35%, 
roughly comparable with the national banks’ level of 3.37%.  
 
People’s United Bank is the largest banking institution in the State with its 
total assets reaching $30.1 billion.  Webster is the second largest with $20.1 billion 
of total assets (based on FDIC Q4 2012 data).  
 
Both banks comply with the minimum core (Tier 1) capital to risk-weighted 
assets ratio implied by Basel III.  The effective minimum core capital ratio is set 
forth by the Basel Committee at 11% (6% base ratio, plus both the conservation 
buffer and the countercyclical buffer at 2.5%). People’s core capital ratio is currently 
at 12.2% (based FDIC Q4 2012 data) and Webster’s at 11.6%. The total capital to 
risk weighted assets ratio is set by Basel III at 13% (8% baseline, plus the two 
buffers of 2.5%). People’s total capital ratio of 13.1% barely satisfies this minimum 
requirement, while Webster fails short of this benchmark with its ratio of 12.8%. 
Moreover, Webster funding sources rely more heavily on borrowed funds than on 
deposits. It has 4.99 times more deposits than total borrowings, while the same 
multiplier for People’s is 6.75.  In essence, People’s depository base is more solid 
than Webster’s and its reliance on borrowed funds is less pronounced, which makes 
the largest State bank more resilient to possible adverse effects (i.e. the elevated 
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interest rate risk) of the departure of the Federal Reserve from its current 
quantitative easing policy course at some point in the future. 
 
Worrisome for solvency are also excessive holdings of derivatives by 
Webster reaching the level of $9,834 million – considerably higher than People’s 
$2,963 million. 
 
In sum, People’s is more profitable and better capitalized than Webster. For 
these reasons, it is likely to withstand possible adverse effects of the policy reversal 
by the Federal Reserve.  However the generally favorable profitability and solvency 
conditions of Connecticut’s largest banks will be likely compromised if the Federal 
Reserve exits from its current zero-lower-bound interest rate, ultra-easy monetary 
policy. 
 
  
Net Interest Income of Connecticut Banks 
 
 Net interest income was calculated by subtracting total interest expense from 
total interest income. National commercial bank profitability has risen 64% over the 
past ten years compared to an increase of 551% in profitability among Connecticut 
commercial banks. Connecticut commercial banks have been more profitable for a 
few reasons. Firstly, since the recent financial crisis there has been 483 failed 
government assisted banks, zero of which have been in Connecticut. Furthermore, 
Connecticut banks saw a lift in interstate lending regulations in 2004 that only 
allowed Connecticut banks to lend within the state of Connecticut. Since 2004 we 
have seen a huge jump in total interest income within Connecticut commercial 
banks.  
 
 Commercial banks are most likely to remain profitable after the Federal 
Reserve announced on May 1st 2013 that they will continue their asset purchasing 
program of purchasing $85 billion of treasuries and mortgage-backed securities 
each month into 2014.  
 
 
Summary: 
 
 Over the past ten years, we have seen a steady increase in employment 
within the commercial banking sector. National employment is up 14% in these 
institutions while Connecticut employment is up 235%. We have seen a robust 
increase in assets among all commercial banks in the United States. This increase is 
a direct cause from a weaker supply of credit within commercial banks. Since the 
recent financial crisis in 2008, we have seen a weaker credit supply for mortgage 
loans as well as declining interest rates across the board. This activity may suggest 
an end to some of the asset dumping that took place during the recession, when 
banks that chased growth as they made loans and collected deposits, freeze.  
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 As total bank assets soared, we saw the United States government step in and 
adopt a few programs that were designed to strengthen the financial sector. In 2008, 
President George W. Bush signed the Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP) into 
law. This program, as well as the Quantitative Easing Programs that we have seen, 
are simply components of government measures to address the subprime mortgage 
crisis.  
 
 Since the recent financial crisis, it is reasonable to assume that the financial 
crisis currently experienced by U.S. commercial banks was one of solvency. Solvency 
is often referred to as solvency risk and is what banks consider long-term viability. 
If a commercial bank takes on bad loans or its security portfolio declines in value, 
then its capital accounts, which are designed to absorb these losses, become 
stressed. As investors and depositors become aware that this is going on, they may 
withdraw their funds and the bank will become insolvent and most likely fail. The 
Basel Committee on Banking Supervision has issued Basel II and Basel III scenarios, 
which are recommendations on banking laws and regulations. These were intended 
to create an international standard for banking regulators to control how much 
capital banks need to put aside to guard against the types of financial and 
operational risks banks face. Currently, commercial banks are meeting Basel III 
standards, but not by much. There is still much more room to increase solvency 
within our commercial banks. 
 
 Asset quality in commercial banks has decreased substantially since 2010. 
Nationally, we saw a peak in asset quality in 2010 before dropping down to its 
current level of 1.91%. In the state of Connecticut we also saw asset quality peak in 
2010 before falling to its current level of 1.2%. National banks currently have a 
better overall quality of assets than that of banks in Connecticut. The recent decline 
in asset quality could be directly attributed to the high amount of foreclosures as 
well as the current weak supply of credit among these institutions. Asset quality has 
fallen since the crisis due to extravagant lending prior to the recession.  
 
 Net interest income has risen among commercial banks as we are seeing 
them become more profitable. National commercial bank profitability has risen 64% 
over the past ten years compared to an increase of 551% in profitability among 
Connecticut commercial banks. Connecticut commercial banks have been more 
profitable for a few reasons. Firstly, since the recent financial crisis there has been 
483 failed government assisted banks, zero of which have been in Connecticut. 
Furthermore, Connecticut banks saw a lift in interstate lending regulations in 2004 
that only allowed Connecticut banks to lend within the state of Connecticut. Since 
2004 we have seen a huge jump in total interest income within Connecticut 
commercial banks.  
 
 Commercial banks are most likely to remain profitable after the Federal 
Reserve announced on May 1st 2013 that they would continue their asset 
purchasing program of purchasing $85 billion of treasuries and mortgage-backed 
securities each month into 2014.  
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